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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE •"
 (l : 
Plaint . /Appellee, : Case Nu, 9J"U2tj,iD-i'A. 
v. : Priority No. I1 
GREG ELDER, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions of distribution of a 
conl ro.l i ed si ibstance a secoi id degree f el 01 i j :ii i 1 ., I o] ati on of 
Utah Code Ai m § 58- 3 7-8(1 )(a)(ii) (Supp. 1992) and possession of 
a controlled substance, a tl :i I rd degree felony, i i I violation of 
Judicial District Court ii i and for Davis County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Douglas I Cornaby, presiding •< * • j has 
J U V . .1 S C . l 1 .1? t„ 1 <• I'll I  I! I! 11 " II I) I I 111:? f l ( J | H ; : f i ; | | I ] I III" i t ••'« | 
3(2) (f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue presented on appea! f whether trial 
c defenu 
pleas appea; A r: -' ,;t F AVU I; C a motion to set 
aside a ;uilty r disturber it clearly 
appears that the trie amisea r us.; ret ion, State v. 
Thorup, _
 w ^ _ November 1,3, 1992) 
( zl ta 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any applicable constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules needed for a determination of this case are included in the 
argument section of this brief• 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with distributing 
a controlled substance, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1992) and possession of 
a controlled substance with intent to distribute, also a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann, § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) 
(Supp, 1992) (R. 9). Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, the 
latter count was amended to reflect a charge of possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iii) (Supp. 1992) (R. 9). Defendant 
entered pleas of guilty to each count as charged in the amended 
information (R. 67). 
Based on the State's recommendation made pursuant to 
the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to 
concurrent prison terms of 1 to 15 years on count I and zero to 5 
years on count II. It then stayed the execution of those 
sentences and placed defendant on probation for three years. 
Among the terms of probation was a requirement that defendant 
spend 120 days in the county jail. However, the trial court 
ordered that defendant serve that time in home confinement with a 
work release exception (R. 112-13, 190-93; Transcript of Hearing 
on Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas, dated March 18, 
2 
1992, at 123 [hereinafter "Tr."])-
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant was the target of an investigation directed 
by the Davis County Metro Narcotics Strike Force. The strike 
force sent an undercover officer to the residence at which 
defendant was residing (the home of defendant's parents) to 
complete a controlled drug buy. The agent carried a "wire," and 
the transaction was recorded by police. A search warrant for the 
residence was then obtained and executed (Tr. 124-25). 
Police recovered "a substantial quantity" of cocaine, 
drug paraphernalia, and materials for packaging and distributing 
narcotics. Defendant's codefendant, Weaver, was present when the 
warrant was executed. At the time, Weaver was in possession of a 
controlled substance, and he was charged accordingly. Defendant 
was charged with distributing a controlled substance and with 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute 
(R. 124-25). 
As the trial court noted in its findings, public 
defender Michael Murphy was appointed to represent both defendant 
and Weaver (R. 202). (A copy of the trial court's findings of 
fact and conclusions of law is attached hereto as Addendum A.) 
Mr. Murphy met with defendant several times (R. 203-4; Tr. 86-8). 
Weaver was also present at at least one of those meetings, most 
likely their first one. Mr. Murphy discussed the possibility of 
a conflict arising if one of the two wished to testify against 
the other, and both defendants indicated that they had no desire 
3 
to testify against one another because they were good friends. 
Defendant and Weaver both agreed that they wanted to be 
represented by Mr. Murphy (R. 204). 
Sometime later, Mr. Murphy arranged for the three to 
listen to the surveillance tape of the drug transaction. After 
listening to the tape, Mr. Murphy again asked defendant if he was 
interested in testifying against Weaver or cooperating with the 
State in some other capacity. This conversation occurred outside 
of Weaver's presence. Mr. Murphy also pursued the same issues 
with Weaver outside of defendant's presence (Tr. 85, 89). Again, 
both defendant and Weaver rejected the idea of testifying against 
each other and expressed their desire to go forward to assert 
their innocence (R. 204; Tr. 89). 
Mr. Murphy also reviewed the police reports with 
defendant, filed and argued a motion to suppress the evidence 
that formed the basis of the charges against defendant and 
Weaver, and met with defendant to prepare for the suppression 
hearing. After the trial court denied defendant's motion to 
suppress, Mr. Murphy explained the court's ruling to defendant 
and discussed possible plea negotiations as well as again asking 
whether defendant would be interesting in working for the Davis 
County Metro Strike Force (R. 202; Tr. 88). 
Throughout his representation of defendant, Mr. Murphy 
also had several discussions with the prosecutor (R. 203), 
William McGuire, about the State's willingness to reduce the 
charges against defendant in return for defendant's cooperation, 
4 
as well as what sentencing recommendations the State would make 
(Tr. 96, 127). 
Mr. Murphy eventually secured a plea bargain for 
defendant. The terms of the plea bargain were as follows: 
1) the State would amend the information to reflect charges of 
distribution of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, 
and would reduce the charge of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute, also a second degree felony, 
to simple possession, a third degree felony; 2) the State would 
recommend that concurrent sentences be imposed; 3) the State 
would recommend that defendant serve no time in prison, but be 
placed on probation; and finally 4) the State would recommend 
that any jail time imposed include a work release provision (R. 
112-13; Tr. 123). 
Mr. Murphy explained the proposed agreement to 
defendant, and defendant was initially reluctant to accept the 
offer because he was concerned about his ability to work and keep 
his business operational if he were to be incarcerated (Tr. 92-
3). Mr. Murphy then explained to defendant that, "based upon 
[his] experience . . . before Judge Cornaby . . . and based upon 
the recommendation of the prosecutor, that work release on this 
matter would be highly likely a possibility. But [Mr. Murphy] 
clearly indicated that [he could not] make any promises" (Tr. 
93). Defendant was reassured and decided that he would plead 
guilty (Tr. 93-7). 
The matter had been set for trial on January 9, 1992. 
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However, prior to that date, Mr. Murphy conveyed defendant's 
desire to accept the plea agreement to Mr. McGuire (R. 203; Tr. 
97). At the time that Mr. Murphy indicated that defendant would 
plead guilty, it was anticipated that Weaver would go to trial 
(R. 203; Tr. 94). 
On January 9, 1992, Mr. Murphy and Mr. McGuire met with 
defendant and confirmed his desire to plead guilty. According to 
both attorneys, defendant was primarily interested in knowing 
what sentence he would receive and was particularly concerned 
that he be allowed to serve any jail time on a work release 
basis. The plea agreement was again explained to defendant, and 
he reaffirmed his desire to accept the plea agreement (Tr. 99, 
123). Although the record indicates that Weaver decided that he 
would also enter a plea of guilty (Tr. 62), it does not reflect 
what sentencing recommendations the State made in that case. 
Defendant later moved to withdraw his pleas, claiming 
that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his 
counsel, who represented both defendant and his co-defendant, had 
a conflict of interest. The trial court required defendant to 
demonstrate that counsel had an actual conflict of interest 
because neither defendant nor his co-defendant ever claimed that 
there was a conflict before defendant entered his pleas (R. 203). 
The trial court further found that •' [i]nasmuch as 
neither was going to testify against the other, the two 
defendants were satisfied there was no conflictf, and] Mr. Murphy 
was satisfied that no actual conflict existed" (R. 204). After 
6 
determining that defendant's counsel had no actual conflict of 
interest, the trial court rejected defendant's claim and denied 
his motion to withdraw his pleas (R. 205). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant advances two claims on appeal. First, he 
claims that he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty 
pleas because the trial court failed to conduct an inquiry into 
counsel's alleged conflict of interest before it accepted 
defendant's pleas. Second, defendant claims he was denied his 
right to effective assistance of counsel because his counsel had 
an actual conflict of interest. 
Under State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65 (Utah App. 1990), 
defendant's claims must fail. First, neither defendant nor his 
co-defendant ever raised the issue of a potential conflict of 
interest prior to when defendant entered his pleas of guilty. 
The mere fact that counsel represented both defendants did not 
oblige the trial court to investigate the possibility that a 
conflict existed. Consequently, in order to make out his claim 
of ineffective representation, defendant had to establish that 
his counsel had an actual conflict of interest. 
Just as he has done on appeal, defendant below did 
little more than propose a scenario under which counsel had a 
possible conflict of interest. Under the circumstances, the 
trial court properly found that defendant had failed to prove 
that his counsel had an actual conflict as required under Webb. 
This Court should therefore hold that the trial court did not 
7 
abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion to withdraw 
his pleas and affirm defendant's convictions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE A DUTY TO 
INQUIRE INTO DEFENSE COUNSEL'S ALLEGED 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST BECAUSE THE ISSUE WAS 
NEVER RAISED UNTIL DEFENDANT FILED HIS MOTION 
TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA. 
In accepting defendant's pleas, the trial court fully 
complied with the requirements of rule 11, and defendant does not 
contend otherwise. Rather, defendant argues that the trial court 
failed to investigate the possibility that counsel's 
representation of both defendant and his codefendant created a 
conflict of interest, and that the court therefore abused its 
discretion by refusing to allow defendant to withdraw his pleas. 
As demonstrated below, defendant's claim is predicated on a 
faulty reading of this Court's opinion in State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 
65 (Utah App. 1990) . 
In Webb, this Court made clear that although "trial 
judges [have a duty] to investigate any timely objections to 
multiple representation, the sixth amendment does not require 
state court judges to initiate sua sponte inquiries into the 
propriety of an attorney's representation of codefendants in 
every case[.],f id. at 72-3 (relying on Cuvler v. Sullivan, 446 
U.S. 335, 346-46, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1717-18 (1980) and United 
States v. Burnev, 756 F.2d 787, 790-93 (10th Cir. 1985)). 
Consequently, where a defendant neither objects to multiple 
8 
representation nor raises a conflict of interest issue, the sixth 
amendment does not require the trial court to initiate an 
inquiry. Id.* a t 73. 
In this case, the trial court found that neither 
defendant nor his codefendant ever "raise[d] an objection or 
assert[ed] a question concerning the[ir] [joint] representation 
by [trial counsel, and there] was no claim at all of a conflict 
[of interest]" (R. 203). Nor is there any evidence in the record 
that suggests the trial court "kn[ew] or reasonably should [have] 
know[n] that a particular conflict exist[ed].M Webb, 790 P.2d at 
73 (citations omitted). 
Defendant does not challenge the trial court's finding 
that neither he nor his codefendant ever raised the issue of a 
possible conflict of interest. However, he does allege that the 
trial court had a duty to initiate an inquiry because the court 
knew or should have known that a conflict existed (Br. of 
Appellant at 7). Specifically, defendant claims that because his 
codefendant was charged with a "substantially lesser" offense, 
the trial court should have known that counsel was conflicted 
insofar as "[p]lausible alternative strategies, including plea 
bargaining in exchange for one co-defendant's testimony against 
the other, or shifting the blame toward one in an effort to 
exonerate another, could not be pursued without adversely 
affecting one of the co-defendants" (Br. of Appellant at 8). 
Defendant provides no legal analysis and cites no 
authority to support this claim. On that basis alone, this Court 
9 
should reject defendant's claim. See State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 
1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) ("Since the defendant fails to support 
[his] argument [with] any legal analysis or authority, we decline 
to rule on it."); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah App.) 
("[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly 
defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a 
depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of 
argument and research."). 
Moreover, defendant's assertion ignores the fact "that 
a possible conflict of interest inheres in almost every instance 
of multiple representation[.]" Webb, 790 P.2d at 73 (citation 
omitted). Each of the possible conflicts to which defendant 
alludes may be present whenever counsel represents multiple 
parties. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the 
issue of a possible conflict of interest was "brought home" to 
the trial court to any greater degree than would be true in 
nearly every case in which there is representation of multiple 
defendants. Consequently, the trial court was under no 
obligation to initiate a sua sponte inquiry into potential 
conflicts of interests at the time it accepted defendant's pleas. 
See id.; Cuvler, 446 U.S. at 346-46, 100 S. Ct. at 1717-18; 
Burnev, 756 F.2d at 790-93. Therefore, the fact that the trial 
court did not conduct such an inquiry does not constitute "good 
cause" to justify granting defendant's motion to withdraw his 
guilty pleas, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
denying defendant's motion. See State v. Thorup, 200 Utah Adv. 
10 
Rep. 67, 68 (Utah App. November 13, 1992) (a trial court's denial 
of a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that the trial 
court abused its discretion). 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HIS 
TRIAL COUNSEL HAD AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF 
INTEREST. HIS CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVENESS 
THEREFORE FAILSf AND THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL 
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEAS 
SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
Because the alleged conflict in this case was not 
raised by defendant until after he entered his pleas, the trial 
court properly required defendant to demonstrate that his counsel 
had an actual conflict of interest which adversely affected his 
counsel's performance. Defendant failed to meet that burden, and 
the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by denying 
defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. 
This Court has recognized that a defendant who failed 
object to multiple representation or to raise a conflict of 
interest issue "can succeed on his sixth amendment 
ineffectiveness of counsel claim only if he demonstrates both 
that counsel actively represented conflicting interests and that 
an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's 
performance." Webb, 790 P.2d at 75 (citations omitted). See 
also State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 488 (Utah App. 1991) (same 
proposition as Webb). However, ,f[i]f the defendant makes such a 
showing, prejudice need not be demonstrated to prevail on the 
claim." Johnson, 823 P.2d at 488. Rather, this Court "will 
11 
presume the defendant was prejudiced by the lawyer's 
performance." Id. 
This Court in Webb articulated the following test for 
demonstrating that an actual conflict existed: 
In order to show an actual conflict of 
interest existed, a defendant must point to 
specific instances in the record to suggest 
an actual conflict or impairment of his or 
her interests. There is no violation where 
the conflict is irrelevant or merely 
hypothetical; there must be an actual, 
significant conflict. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
This Court elaborated on the above standard by quoting 
the following passage from an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
decision: 
Appellants must make a factual showing of 
inconsistent interests and must demonstrate 
that the attorney "made a choice between 
possible alternative courses of action. . . . 
If he did not make such a choice, the 
conflict remained hypothetical." . . . . An 
actual conflict of interest exists when the 
respective defenses of multiple defendants 
are inconsistent, i.e., if "introduction of 
probative evidence or plausible arguments 
that would significantly benefit one 
defendant would damage the defense of another 
defendant whom the same counsel is 
representing." 
Webb, 790 P.2d at 75 (quoting United States v. Mers, 701 F.2d 
1321, 1328 (11th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 464 
U.S. 991, 104 S. Ct. 481 (1983)). 
"Until a defendant shows an actual conflict, 'he has 
not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of 
ineffectiveness.'" Jd.. (citation omitted). As demonstrated 
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below, defendant has not satisfied his burden of showing that his 
counsel had an actual conflict of interest because he can make no 
"factual showing of inconsistent interests." Nor can he 
demonstrate that counsel made a choice between possible 
alternative courses of action. 
Here, defendant alleges that counsel labored under an 
actual conflict of interest because he "could not pursue 
plausible strategies such as blame shifting or cooperation with 
the prosecution" (Br. of Appellant at 11). To support his 
assertion, defendant claims that "both co-defendants were asked 
by Mr. Murphy in each other's presence 'who's narking on who?'" 
(Br. of Appellant at 10). That assertion distorts the record.1 
According to Mr. Murphy, he spoke with both defendants 
about the possibility of their testifying against one another, 
but neither was willing to do so because of their close 
friendship (Tr. 85). After listening to police surveillance 
tapes of the drug transaction that formed the basis of the 
charges, counsel again spoke with the defendants, this time 
outside of each other's presence, about whether either of them 
1
 Although defendant cites to Mr. Murphy's testimony to 
support his assertion that Mr. Murphy asked, "Who's narking on 
who?" a review of the record indicates that it was defendant who 
first testified that Mr. Murphy posed the question in the highly 
inflammatory form quoted above (Tr. 12); Weaver later repeated it 
(Tr. 57). 
In contrast, Mr. Murphy expressly denied asking the 
defendants the question in the form defendant has presented it in 
his brief (Tr. 73). The fair inference to be drawn from the 
trial court's ruling is that it was not persuaded that Mr. Murphy 
posed the question quoted by defendant. Moreover, defendant's 
recital of his own testimony while attributing it to Mr. Murphy 
is inappropriate and potentially misleading. 
13 
was willing to testify against the other (Tr. 89). Both 
defendants again indicated that they did not want to testify 
against their friend and that they both wanted to go forward on 
the basis that they were innocent of the charges against them 
(Tr- 89). 
With respect to this issue, the trial court entered the 
following findings of fact: 
16. After Mr. Murphy was assigned to 
represent [defendant] and Mr. Weaver he met 
with both of them simultaneously. Mr. M\irphy 
had several meetings with [defendant]. The 
matter of a potential conflict of interest 
was discussed. 
17. Mr. Weaver and [defendant] have 
been and are good friends and have known each 
other for many years. They work together. 
18. Part of the discussion Mr. Murphy 
had with [defendant] and Mr. Weaver concerned 
the possibility of one of them testifying 
against the other. Because of their 
friendship neither was willing to do that. 
Inasmuch as neither was willing to testify 
against the other, the two defendants were 
satisfied there was no conflict. Mr. Murphy 
was satisfied that no conflict existed. 
19. Both [defendant] and Mr. Weaver 
agreed that Mr. Murphy could represent both 
of them. 
(R. 203-04) (emphasis added). 
Defendant has not challenged the trial court's findings 
of facts. Nor has he presented any evidence that indicates his 
counsel "made a choice between possible alternative courses of 
action. . . . [or that] the respective defenses of [defendant and 
his codefendant] [we]re inconsistent.]" Webb, 790 P.2d at 75 
(citation omitted). Rather, defendant has merely articulated a 
14 
"hypothetical" conflict; he has not demonstrated that it actually 
developed. 
Although defendant has described the sort of conflict 
of interest that might arise in cases of multiple representation, 
that is a far cry from demonstrating that an actual conflict 
existed in this case. Moreover, the record indicates that 
counsel thought through the possible conflicts and discussed them 
with defendant. It was then for defendant to decide how he 
wished to proceed. 
Defendant could have chosen to serve as an informant or 
he could have testified against his codefendant. Although 
defendant now claims that his counsel had an actual conflict of 
interest that prevented him from considering such strategies, the 
record establishes that his counsel did in fact investigate such 
possible strategies as blame shifting and cooperation with the 
prosecution. However, just as did the defendant in Webb, 
defendant decided to stand united with his friend instead of 
breaking rank to testify against him.2 
As the trial court recognized in its findings, Mr. 
Murphy pursued a relatively vigorous defense, which included 
moving to suppress the evidence that formed the basis of the 
2
 If, however, either defendant or Weaver had indicated that 
they were interested in testifying against the other and counsel 
had pursued that alternative while continuing to represent both 
of the two men, then the conflict would no longer have been 
merely hypothetical* In that circumstance, counsel could not 
properly represent both defendants. Indeed, counsel in that 
setting may even be duty bound to decline representation of 
either defendant if he had obtained privileged information that 
would have unfairly prejudiced either defendant. 
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charges against defendant (R. 204). Moreover, both Mr. Murphy 
and Mr. McGuire testified that defendant was primarily concerned 
with the issue of sentencing and especially wanted to be granted 
work release status in the event he was ordered to serve time in 
jail (Tr. 93-4, 123). 
Mr. Murphy had extensive discussions with the 
prosecutor and eventually negotiated a highly favorable plea 
agreement for defendant that included reducing one of the second 
degree felony charges to a third degree felony charge, as well as 
recommendations by the State that the sentences run concurrently, 
that defendant serve no time in prison and that any jail time 
imposed be ordered on a work release basis (R. 112-13, Tr. 123). 
Defendant opted to accept that plea agreement. 
The trial court ultimately followed the State's 
sentencing recommendations and even ordered that defendant serve 
the 120 days of jail time in home confinement instead of at the 
county jail (R. 203-04). In light of the overwhelming evidence 
admissible against defendant, particularly the police tape of the 
drug sale that defendant made to an undercover officer, it 
appears that Mr. Murphy did an outstanding job of negotiating a 
plea on behalf of defendant. Under these circumstances, it 
cannot be said that "counsel's loyalty" was divided between 
defendant and Weaver by an actual conflict of interest. Webb, 
790 P.2d at 76 (citations omitted). 
To summarize briefly, the trial court was under no 
obligation to initiate a sua sponte inquiry into the issue of 
16 
whether defendant's counsel was conflicted because defendant 
never raised that issue until he moved to withdraw his pleas. 
Nor did counsel have an actual conflict of interest that 
adversely affected his representation of defendant. The trial 
court therefore acted well within its discretion in denying 
defendant's motion to withdraw his pleas. This Court should 
therefore affirm defendant's convictions. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
uphold the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw 
his pleas and affirm defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7 day of February, 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
QcM/i. 
TODD A. UTZIWGER^ 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
Carvel R. Harward #1403 
Davis County Attorney's Office 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 451-4300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DESERTCT^ 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED W 
KM 23 
CLtru. . 
BY 
CLERK'S '•' 
9 co u 
u . . v -
"
:CE 
•q? 
' T 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. j 
GREG DENTON ELDER, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER CONCERNING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA 
Case No. 91170 7289 
Hon. Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
defendant's motion to withdraw guilty plea on the 18th day of 
March, 1992. The defendant was present in person and represented 
by his attorney, Nick H. Porterfield. The State was represented by 
Carvel R. Harward, Chief Deputy Davis County Attorney, the 
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge, presided. 
Based upon the file herein and the testimony produced at 
the evidentiary hearing referred to in preceding paragraph, the 
Court makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On the 9th day of January, 1992, Greg D. Elder, 
above-named defendant, pled guilty to possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony and also to distribution of a 
controlled substance, a felony of the second degree. He was 
represented by Michael Murphy who had been previously appointed. 
2. Thereafter, Nick H. Porterfield filed defendant's 
motion for withdrawal of guilty plea. The motion is dated the 29th 
day of January, 1992. 
3. A memorandum in support of defendant's motion was 
filed. The State filed a memorandum in opposition to defendant's 
motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea. 
4. A transcript of the proceedings involving the guilty 
plea has been prepared and made a part of the record. 
5. The above-named defendant was originally charged with 
distribution of cocaine, alleged to have occurred on the 23rd day 
of May, 1991 and with possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute, alleged to have occurred the same date, each charge 
being a second degree felony. A co-defendant, Philip J. Weaver, 
was charged with possession of cocaine in connection with the same 
episode. 
6. Greg D. Elder appeared before the Circuit Court on 
the 26th day of June, 1991. At that time he had no attorney and 
waived his preliminary hearing. Stephen Oda was appointed to 
represent the defendant. However, that appointment was changed at 
a later date when Michael Murphy assumed Mr. Oda's public defender 
caseload. 
7. On the 19th day of August, 1991, defendant's motion 
to suppress evidence came on regularly for hearing. The Court 
denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence and the matter 
was set for trial. 
8. William K. McGuire, attorney for the plaintiff in the 
above-entitled action, had several discussions with Mr. Murphy. 
9. The matter was set for trial to be conducted on the 
9th day of January, 1992. Prior to that date, Mr. Murphy 
communicated to Mr. McGuire that defendant, Greg D. Elder, would 
plead guilty. At the time Mr. Murphy indicated that defendant 
Elder would plead guilty, it was anticipated that co-defendant 
Weaver would go to trial. 
10. On January 9, 1992, the defendant Greg Elder, the 
co-defendant, Philip Weaver, Bill McGuire as the prosecutor, and 
Michael Murphy as defense attorney, appeared at the Court presided 
over by Judge Cornaby. Prospective jurors were available at the 
Courthouse. 
11. Bill McGuire and Michael Murphy had several 
conversations. Those two attorneys also had conversations with the 
two defendants. 
12. Each defendant pled guilty. 
13. At no time did either defendant raise an objection 
or assert a question concerning the representation by Mr. Murphy. 
There was no claim at all of a conflict. 
14. A record was created concerning the entry of 
defendant Elder's guilty plea. As referred to above, a transcript 
of that proceeding has been produced. The Court covered all 
aspects of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
15. The parties were advised that a prospective jury was 
available in the Courthouse. The Court accepted the guilty plea of 
Mr. Elder to a second degree felony and also to a third degree 
felony. There was no trial and the jury was excused. 
16. After Mr. Murphy was assigned to represent Mr. Elder 
and Mr. Weaver he met with both of them simultaneously. Mr. Murphy 
had several meetings with Mr. Elder. The matter of a potential 
conflict of interest was discussed. 
17. Mr. Weaver and Mr. Elder have been and are good 
friends and have known one another for many years. They work 
together. 
18. Part of the discussion Mr. Murphy had with Mr. Elder 
and Mr. Weaver concerned the possibility of one of them testifying 
against the other. Because of their friendship neither was willing 
to do that. Inasmuch as neither was going to testify against the 
other, the two defendants were satisfied there was no conflict. 
Mr. Murphy was satisfied that no actual conflict existed. 
19. Both Mr. Elder and Mr. Weaver agreed that Mr. Murphy 
could represent both of them. 
20. Mr. Murphy pursued a relatively vigorous defense for 
Mr. Elder and Mr. Weaver until trial time. There had been an 
evidentiary hearing concerning defendant's request to have evidence 
suppressed. 
21. Mr. Elder, the defendant, is an intelligent person. 
He operates a business. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court strictly followed Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure in taking the guilty pleas. 
2. The defendant, Greg D. Elder, entered an intelligent, 
knowing and voluntary guilty plea. 
3. There has been no showing that Mr. Murphy acted 
incompetently as counsel for defendant Greg D. Elder. 
4. There has been no showing that a conflict of interest 
existed, 
5. The Court finds that there was not an actual 
conflict. 
6. There has been no prejudice to Greg D. Elder arising 
out of the arrangement whereby Michael Murphy represented both Greg 
D. Elder and a co-defendant in the case. 
WHEREFORE, defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas was and is denied. 
DATED this ^L/ day of May, 1992. 
"JUDGE^  
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Concerning 
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, with postage prepaid 
thereon, to Nick Porterfield, Attorney for Defendant, at 75 East 
400 South, Suite 203, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this \°^ day 
of May, 1992. 
